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INCENTIVIZING THE ORDINARY USER
Gaia Bernstein∗
Abstract
Disputes regarding the effectiveness of the patent system focus on the
appropriate scope of patent rights. This Article departs from the traditional
debate and looks instead at the players regulated by the patent system. This
Article shows that the patent system fails to effectively encourage
technological dissemination because it focuses on the patent owner and his
competitors but largely ignores a crucial player: the ordinary user.
The user, in his everyday decisions of whether to adopt a technology,
plays a critical role in determining whether a new technology will be
disseminated. Yet patent law contains an overly simplistic view of the
ordinary user. It views the ordinary user as motivated only by price and
availability. This Article uncovers the intricacy of ordinary users’
technological adoption decisions. It identifies two principle factors that
influence user resistance to new technology: novelty and perceived
consequences.
Many believe that the market rule should govern the adoption process
of new technologies, that is, the market should decide which technologies
society adopts. Yet this rule fails to recognize the variety of factors that
influence the ordinary user. This Article proposes that while government
action to encourage user adoption should not be the norm, government
action that gently nudges the user could prove particularly effective in
cases of market failures. In conclusion, this Article suggests two instances
in which government action is particularly warranted: first, when market
failure occurs because a technology is dependent on network effects and
the accumulation of a critical mass of users; second, when there is a critical
need to disseminate a technology quickly.
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INTRODUCTION
Critics of the patent system argue that it fails to achieve its goal of
advancing progress. They argue that it fails to advance progress through
the promotion of innovation and dissemination because Congress and the
courts have overly expanded patent owners’ rights.1 This Article focuses
1. While most scholarship focuses on the effects of strong patent rights on innovation, some
scholars argue that strong patent rights inhibit dissemination. For scholarship on the effect of strong

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/7

2

Bernstein: Incentivizing the Ordinary User

2014]

INCENTIVIZING THE ORDINARY USER

1277

on the dissemination of new technologies—their social adoption process. It
offers a novel outlook on patent law’s failure to effectively encourage the
dissemination of new technologies.2 Instead of focusing on the strength of
patent rights, it points to the patent system’s neglect of an important class
of players which has a critical influence on technological dissemination.
The patent system focuses on the patent owner and his competitors while it
largely fails to acknowledge the significant role of the ordinary user—even
the couch potato—in his important everyday decisions to adopt or not
adopt a new technology.3
User decisions determine the fate of many technologies. For example,
electronic book readers, such as the Kindle and the Nook, currently flood
our markets. Users of electronic readers can instantaneously purchase and
carry with them a practically unlimited number of weightless books that
users can easily read off the device’s screen. Yet many potential users
refuse to purchase electronic readers—they prefer the comfort of the oldfashioned paper book and lament a world of bare library walls no longer
adorned by books.4 Similarly, handwritten health records in hospitals and
physicians’ offices can now be replaced with electronic records that
patent rights on innovation, see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (describing
the detrimental effect of strong patent rights on downstream scientific discoveries); Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 289 (2003) (discussing the detrimental effects of university-owned patents on scientific
research). For scholarship on the effect of strong patent rights on dissemination, see generally Gaia
Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2292–301 (2010) (discussing
the effects of strong patent rights on the dissemination of genetic testing); Jeanne C. Fromer, The
Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75 (2008) (discussing the importance
of looking beyond conception in the context of the nonobviousness analysis).
2. The goal of this Article is not to replace the traditional insights regarding the impact of
the scope of patent rights on the effectiveness of the patent system. Instead, the objective of the
Article is to shed additional light on the problems that underlie the effectiveness of the patent
system and expand the existent discourse.
3. Few scholars address the importance of the social acceptance of a technology by the
users. For exceptions, see generally Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New
Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002) (discussing
the historical acceptance process of the technology of artificial insemination); Erik Lillquist &
Sarah E. Waldeck, Government Action in Emerging Networked Technologies, 87 OR. L. REV. 581
(2008) (discussing the social acceptance process of electronic payments).
4. See LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET AM. & LIFE PROJECT, TABLET AND E-BOOK READER
OWNERSHIP NEARLY DOUBLE OVER THE HOLIDAY GIFT-GIVING PERIOD 2 (2012), available at
http://libraries.pewinternet.org/files/legacy-pdf/Pew_Tablets%20and%20e-readers%20double%201.
23.2012.pdf (showing that although the rate of e-reader ownership is rising steadily, as of 2012, the
majority of the U.S. population still does not own e-readers); see also Shantella Y. Sherman &
James Wright, eBooks Come of Age, WASH. INFORMER (Sept. 1, 2010), http://washingtoninformer.com/
news/2010/sep/01/ebooks-come-of-age (discussing concerns regarding the demise of books and
libraries).
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centralize all available records about a patient and reduce errors caused by
illegible handwriting and missing information. Yet some of the systems’
users—medical professionals who are unfamiliar with the novel
technology—resist. They claim that the entry of information into the
system detracts from their ability to focus on their medical duties.5 In both
cases, it is neither the patent owner nor the competitors who are
responsible for the extent of dissemination of the technologies. Instead,
regular everyday users are the ones who play this vital role.
This Article begins by examining the patent system’s tools that are
designed to promote the dissemination of inventions once they enter the
market. It examines two doctrines—compulsory licensing and patent
misuse—and demonstrates that both doctrines focus on the patent owner
and his competitors to indirectly nudge the user. Misconduct of the patent
owner can trigger both doctrines, which then look to the patent owner’s
competitors to facilitate dissemination as they increase production and
reduce prices. In essence, these doctrines treat competition as a proxy for
dissemination; they assume that if price is reduced and availability
increased, innovations will attain increased user adoption.6
Patent law focuses on the patent owner and his competitors because it
contains a simplistic view of the user as motivated by only price and
availability. This Article uncovers a more nuanced view of the ordinary
user by providing a taxonomy of reasons for user resistance to adopting
new technologies. It identifies two main sources of user resistance to new
technology: novelty and perceived consequences of adopting the
technology. Users who resist a technology due to its novelty may resist the
novelty of the hardware, as in the case of electronic book readers, or they
may resist the novelty of the technology’s complexity. At the same time,
users may resist a technology due to perceived economic consequences of
the technology, such as employees’ fears of being replaced by technology;
owners’ reluctance to lose investments in older technologies; and the
unattractiveness of a technology that has yet to achieve a critical mass of
users. Users may also fear noneconomic adverse effects, such as fear of
genetically modified food because of potential effects on personal health or
the environment. Finally, they may resist a technology because they view it
as a threat to their moral or religious values, such as the fear that human
cloning will impact the uniqueness of human identity.7
5. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300jj-11 (2012) (listing the goals of electronic health records); Milt
Freudenheim, Many Hospitals Resist Computerized Patient Care, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, at C1
(describing resistance among physicians to use electronic health records systems); Sharona Hoffman
& Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health
Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 112–19 (2008) (describing the benefits of electronic
health record systems).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
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While the law regulates the invention of new technologies through the
patent system, the prevailing view is that the market efficiently determines
which technologies society eventually adopts. Yet relying solely on market
governance to control the adoption of new technologies is problematic.
First of all, reliance on market governance can carry grave costs. History is
replete with adoptions of important and eventually successful technologies
that society resisted or delayed for decades and even centuries. Secondly,
the belief that the market alone determines the fate of new technologies is,
in fact, unfounded. The government, on all levels, regularly intervenes in
many subtle and some unsubtle ways to encourage users to adopt new
technologies.8
The technology-regulating regime is charged with the promotion of
progress.9 Yet patent law, which focuses on innovation and encouraging
competition, executes only part of this mission through rules enforcing
compulsory licensing and patent misuse remedies. This Article underscores
the need for broader, systematic thinking and coordination of the
technology-regulating regime to directly encourage user adoption of
patented and unpatented technologies alike.10 The goal of this Article is not
to set a norm of government action. In fact, some technologies are
unsuccessful inventions that users legitimately resist.11 Yet governmental
action to promote user adoption is already taking place on a broad scale
through Congress, federal agencies, and state and local governments.
Presently, though, these efforts are piecemeal, uncoordinated, and
inconsistent.12
While it does not focus on institutional design, this Article builds on the
important work done by Professors Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai, who
propose an “Office of Innovation Policy” to coordinate government
8. See infra Part III.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. The assumption that underlies this project is that technological innovation is a primary
contributor to long-term well-being. Specifically, this Article relies on writings that describe how
biological and agricultural innovations decrease disease and hunger and contribute to health; how
innovations in communications and information technologies contribute to educational, political,
and social development; and how innovation generally propels economic growth, which contributes
to increased and more egalitarian well-being. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai,
Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 n.24 (2008)
(reviewing literature on the topic). For literature that focuses on technological diffusion and
adoption—as opposed to just invention—as means for the promotion of human progress, see
THOMAS R. DEGREGORI, A THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT xi–xiii (1985) and JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY
AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 10–11 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Dan Tynan, The 25 Worst Tech Products of All Time, PCWORLD (May 26,
2006), http://www.pcworld.com/article/125772/the_25_worst_tech_products_of_all_time.html
(describing the reasons for the failure of twenty-five technology products).
12. See infra Section III.B.
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agencies’ decision-making regarding innovation.13 The articulation and
enforcement of guidelines to promote user adoption through the type of
agency proposed by Benjamin and Rai could improve the coherency and
consistency of government policies. Such guidelines could identify when
governmental action to encourage user adoption is particularly warranted
or when it may be unnecessary, and could lay out effective action modes.
Opponents of government action to encourage user adoption point to
the difficult process of selecting winning technologies. They caution that
the government is likely to err and encourage the adoption of mediocre
technologies, perhaps even at the expense of superior ones. To address this
concern, this Article proposes that the government should limit its action to
gentle nudges to encourage user adoption. Government should not be
coercive and mandate the adoption of a particular new technology, making
it the only viable option. Furthermore, this Article proposes that
government action should be limited only to new classes of technology,
which is where user resistance is most likely to occur, and should not
advance one competing technology over another.14
Finally, this Article argues that although market forces can overcome
some instances of user resistance, government action is particularly
warranted in cases of market failure. This inquiry takes the first step to
indicate the usefulness of systematic thought about government action to
encourage user adoption. To do so, it identifies cases in which government
action is particularly warranted, and through that it sheds light on where
such action may not be necessary and the market may be better suited to
overcome user resistance. This Article highlights two instances of market
failure that could warrant government action. These scenarios are not
meant to be an exhaustive list. The first scenario is where a technology is
characterized by network effects and requires the attainment of critical
mass to achieve widespread adoption. The second scenario involves cases
of urgency—where time is of the essence.15
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines post-market-entry
patent law doctrines to reveal patent law’s overly simplistic view of the
players who influence technological dissemination. Part II highlights the
important role of the user’s everyday technological adoption decisions and
provides a taxonomy of causes for user resistance. Part III reveals the risks
of sole reliance on market governance for the adoption of new
technologies. Part IV highlights the need for an institutional actor to
articulate and enforce systematic guidelines for identifying when
13. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & ARTI K. RAI, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
STRUCTURING U.S. INNOVATION POLICY: CREATING A WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF INNOVATION POLICY 2
(2009).
14. See infra Section IV.B.
15. See infra Part V.
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encouragement of user adoption through gentle nudges is warranted. Part V
highlights two instances of market failure in which action to encourage
user adoption would be warranted.
I. THE PATENT SYSTEM’S ROLE POST-MARKET ENTRY
Scholars, judges, and litigants generally agree that patent law is charged
with the promotion of progress through advancement of both innovation
and dissemination.16 Yet the parties disagree as to whether the patent
system executes its mission effectively.17
Critics of the patent system focus on the effect of strong patent rights on
innovation and argue that broad patent rights impede subsequent
innovation.18 It appears that the focus on innovation may have obstructed a
careful examination of the patent system’s treatment of dissemination. Far
fewer critics focus on dissemination and those who do so generally extend
the innovation prism to criticize the patent system’s effect on
dissemination. Specifically, they argue that strong patent owner rights
enable patent owners to increase prices beyond the threshold intended for
patent monopoly, and thereby unjustifiably restrict public access.19
This Part sheds light on the patent system’s failure to effectively
promote dissemination, and shows that patent law cannot execute its
mission because it fails to adequately account for all the players who
16. For discussions of innovation and progress, see Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2264–68
(describing how academics, legislators, and courts celebrate innovation as the promoter of
progress). For discussions of dissemination and progress, see generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual
Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); Thomas F. Cotter, Memes
and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331 (2005).
17. See, e.g., James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to
Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic
Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 778 (2003) (arguing that strong patent rights promote
innovation in drug development); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the
Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 822–
23 (2001) (discussing the role of patent law and antitrust law in encouraging innovation, focusing
on upstream research products).
18. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing successful peer production on the Internet in the absence of
intellectual property rights); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1 (describing the detrimental effects of
strong patent rights on downstream scientific discoveries); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 1
(discussing the detrimental effects of university patenting on scientific research). See also Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the
Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010) (discussing the limits to creative
production outside the intellectual property paradigm).
19. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Current Controversies Concerning Patent Rights and Public
Health in a World of International Norms, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 673, 673 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008); Amy Kapczynski,
Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1580–81 (2009).
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influence technological dissemination. Patent law doctrines focus on the
patent owner and his competitors but largely ignore the crucial role of the
ordinary user. In essence, patent law treats competition as a proxy for
dissemination, assuming that once the price barrier is eliminated through
competition, dissemination will be accomplished.
Many patent law doctrines are designed to achieve a balance between
incentivizing the patent owner and promoting the general public welfare by
encouraging the dissemination of new technologies.20 Yet the doctrines
that directly affect dissemination are those that regulate the invention after
it enters the market. This Part examines two doctrines that apply to the
invention after its market entry: compulsory licensing and patent misuse. It
will show that both doctrines focus on the actions of the patent owner and
his competitors, aiming only indirectly to nudge the ordinary user’s
decision-making through the reduction of price. Both doctrines treat
competition as a proxy for dissemination and assume that once the price
barrier is removed, then dissemination will occur.
A. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is intended to encourage dissemination of
inventions in the marketplace. Unlike most of patent law, which focuses on
the earlier stages of the technological process, compulsory licensing
focuses on the dissemination stage and seeks to enhance the use of the
technology. Under this doctrine, the government issues a compulsory
license that permits a party other than the patent owner to make, use, or sell
a patented invention without the patent owner’s consent.21 Compulsory
licenses usually, although not always, provide for royalty payments to the
patent owner.22

20. For example, the exclusivity period is limited to twenty years to ensure that after a limited
period for profit-making, competitors can produce and disseminate the invention more broadly. See
35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (stating that the term of the patent shall be for twenty years from
application). Similarly, the goal of the disclosure requirement is to release information about the
patented invention that competitors can use to disseminate the invention once the patent expires. Id.
§ 112(a) (requiring that a patent application contain a written description enabling any person
skilled in the art to make the invention).
21. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 13 (Comm. Print 1958); NUNO PIRES DE
CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 315 (2d ed. 2005); Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs
at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt
Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 857–58 (2003); Gianna Julian-Arnold, International
Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 349, 349 (1993).
22. Chien, supra note 21, at 868–69 (stating that the government more rarely issues royaltyfree licenses, usually in cases of misconduct).
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Generally, there are four cases in which governments issue compulsory
licenses:23 (1) where the patent owner engages in anticompetitive behavior,
as in merger cases where otherwise the merged entity would control a large
part of the market;24 (2) when the patent owner does not use the patent;25
(3) when the invention is needed to serve the public interest, for example,
to supply drugs or for purposes of national defense;26 and (4) when others
wish to exploit a dependent patent that cannot be used without infringing
another patent.27
U.S. law does not include a general provision for compulsory
licensing.28 Yet the United States is a signatory of several treaties that
endorse compulsory licensing regimes. These treaties include the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,29 the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),30 and the
23. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 21, at 349–50.
24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31(k), Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (providing fewer conditions for the issuance of
compulsory licenses when the patent owner engaged in anticompetitive behavior); see also Jonathan
M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network Model
of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 1044–51 (2000) (describing the issuance of compulsory
licenses in merger cases).
25. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (authorizing compulsory licenses in cases of nonuse). For a
discussion of the issuance of compulsory licenses and patent nonuse, see Kurt M. Saunders, Patent
Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 389, 434–49 (2002).
26. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 31(b) (allowing the issue of compulsory licenses where the
technology is necessary to serve the public interest under certain conditions); see also Amy
Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1061–62 (2005) (discussing difficulties
faced by developing countries attempting to issue compulsory licenses under TRIPS).
27. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 31(l).
28. Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects on the Conflict
Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 711, 712
(2003); Saunders, supra note 25, at 439.
29. Paris Convention, supra note 25, § 5(a) (allowing the issuance of compulsory licenses);
Saunders, supra note 25, at 436 (stating that the United States is a signatory of the Paris
Convention); Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue - Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 329–30 (2007) (describing compulsory licensing under the Paris
Convention).
30. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 31 (providing the conditions for the issuance of compulsory
licenses); Steven D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP ‘Interface’: An Introductory Note, in THE
INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 1, 15 (Steven D.
Anderman ed., 2007); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands
of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 396–411 (2009)
(discussing the scope of compulsory licensing under TRIPS); Kevin Outterson, Disease-Based
Limitations on Compulsory Licenses Under Articles 31 and 31 BIS 17–19 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 09-26, 2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/working
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).31 Thus, while
compulsory licenses are relatively rare in the United States,32 through its
treaty obligations and an amalgamation of statutory provisions, the United
States may, and at times does, authorize some version of a compulsory
license in three of the four above-mentioned categories.33
The ultimate goal of compulsory licensing is to increase availability and
reduce the price of the technology in order to enhance dissemination and
encourage user adoption. Yet compulsory licensing focuses on the actions
of the patent owner and her competitors. Although the law’s objective is to
encourage user adoption, the law contains a simplistic view of the user as
motivated by availability and price alone. Therefore, it concentrates on
deciphering and influencing the conduct of the patent owner and her
competitors. First, the patent owner’s actions or failures to act instigate the
issuance of a compulsory license in three of the four situations in which a
government issues compulsory licenses: anticompetitive behavior, patent
nonuse, and refusal to license to a dependent patent. As for the fourth
public interest category, some causes, such as a sudden need for a drug, are
not related to the patent owner’s behavior. Yet other causes—which
include refusal to increase manufacturing, refusal to license to additional
manufacturers, or refusal to lower prices despite public need—stem from
the patent owner’s conduct. Hence, in most cases, governments issue
compulsory licenses as an antidote to a patent owner’s behavior that limits
dissemination of an invention.
While the patent owner’s conduct instigates the issuance of compulsory
licenses, the law of compulsory licensing focuses on the patent owner’s
competitors to resolve the dissemination problem. By compelling the
papers/documents/OuttersonK052009.pdf (discussing the U.S. position that compulsory licenses
under TRIPS should be limited to certain diseases).
31. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) art. 1709(10), Dec. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
289; Torrance, supra note 29, at 334 (discussing the impact of NAFTA’s compulsory licensing
provisions on U.S. patent policy options).
32. Torrance, supra note 29, at 336.
33. For an example of the anticompetitive behavior category, see In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123
F.T.C. 842, 897–98 (1997) (requiring the merged company to license some of its gene therapy
patent rights to a competitor). For an example of the nonuse category, see 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2012)
(granting the U.S. federal agency that funded the invention march-in rights to issue licenses if the
patent owner refuses to do so). For examples of the public interest category, see 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(2012); Chien, supra note 21, at 862–63 (explaining that the federal government may use
inventions without a patent owner’s consent for just compensation, but a patent owner may not
receive injunctive relief, which prevents the patent owner from refusing to license); Kenneth J.
Nunnenkamp, Compulsory Licensing of Critical Patents Under CERCLA?, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 397, 404–05 (1994) (explaining that the Clean Air Act permits states to issue compulsory
licenses for air pollution reduction technologies if their use is necessary to meet federal air quality
standards). There are no examples in U.S. law of the issuance of compulsory licenses to allow
exploitation of a dependent patent.
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patent owner to license to competitors, the law seeks increased production
of the invention to promote increased dissemination. While the debate
surrounding compulsory licensing mostly focuses on the effect of
compulsory licenses on innovation,34 the underlying assumption is that the
issuance of compulsory licensing would improve access directly or
indirectly by reducing price.35 Hence, the law of compulsory licensing uses
competition as a proxy for dissemination and focuses on increasing
availability and eliminating the price barrier.
B. Patent Misuse
Patent misuse originally developed as a common law equitable
affirmative defense to an infringement claim similar to the traditional
Unclean Hands Doctrine in tort law. Defendants sued for patent
infringement may claim as a defense that the patent owner misused her
patent grant.36 If the defense is successful, the patent is effectively
unenforceable. Courts will refuse to grant the patent owner an injunction or
damages until the patent owner stops any misuse and until the effects of the
misuse dissipate.37
The patent misuse defense applies when the patent owner takes unfair
advantage of his patent rights in the market.38 Examples of actions courts
consider patent misuse include: discriminatory licensing, in which the
patent owner charges some licensees more than others;39 restrictions on the

34. For the debate on the effects of compulsory licensing on innovation, see generally
Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory
Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71 (2011) (discussing effects of
compulsory licensing on innovation in drug development) and Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama,
Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 265
(2010) (using compulsory licensing as a working example for a proposed positive bargaining theory
for intellectual property rights).
35. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 13–14,
66, 78 (1977).
36. R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §18.1 (4th ed. 2010); see also Mark A.
Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1618–
19 (1990) (criticizing the lack of an injury requirement).
37. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.6 (2d ed. 2010); Lemley, supra note 36, at 1613.
38. MOY, supra note 36, § 18.1. Although courts and the legislature greatly constricted the
patent misuse defense through the years, certain actions by patent owners are still considered
misuse. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 37, § 3.2 (describing the historical demise of patent
misuse).
39. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9, 16–17 (D. Alaska 1965)
(finding discriminatory licensing rates of shrimp peeling machinery to constitute patent misuse);
MOY, supra note 36, § 18.31.
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licensee’s ability to resell units of the patented invention;40 requirements
that the licensee pay royalties beyond the patented invention (e.g., royalties
based on the licensee’s total sales or continued payment of royalties after
the patent expires);41 and tying arrangements that require the licensee to
purchase other things from the patent owner in addition to the subject
matter claimed in the patent (e.g., agreements that require the licensee to
purchase unpatented supplies).42
Protection of competition appears to be a core concern of the patent
misuse defense.43 Similar to compulsory licensing, patent misuse attempts
to encourage dissemination by encouraging competition. The goal is for
competitors to raise patent misuse as a defense in order to increase
availability and reduce price for the end user. Yet while the law carefully
considers the conduct and motivation of the patent owner and his
competitors, it addresses the user only indirectly. In all patent misuse cases,
the law focuses on the acts of the patent owner who has taken unfair
advantage of the patent and solves the problem by absolving the owner’s
40. See, e.g., Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding
that the patent owner’s setting of a resale price for a product that inhibits plant growth constitutes
patent misuse), rev’d in part on other grounds, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. MOY, supra note 36, §§ 18.38, 18.40; see, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33–34
(1964) (holding that requiring a licensee to pay a royalty past the expiration of the patent constitutes
patent misuse); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
requiring a licensee to pay a royalty past the expiration of the patent constitutes patent misuse).
42. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (2012) (limiting liability for patent misuse for tying to cases
where the patent owner has a market monopoly). For examples of tying arrangements, see Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489–90 (1942) (where the patent owner agreed to
lease his patented machine that automatically deposited salt tablets only if customers agreed to buy
all their salt tablets from the patent owner); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 30–31, 33–34 (1931) (where the patent owner tied the sale of his patented invention to the
sale of unpatented carbon dioxide).
43. Many scholars point to the language of the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing v. AMF, which
reframed the test with antitrust competition terminology and stated that “the alleged infringer [must]
show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the grant
with anticompetitive effect.” Windsurfing Int’l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
see also Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 913 (2007) (citing Windsurfing and
stating that the “Federal Circuit itself has come to define patent misuse as ‘impermissibly
broaden[ing] the “physical or temporal scope”’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effects”
(alteration in original)). Some commentators note that patent misuse law goes beyond the traditional
competition objectives of antitrust law because for some patent licensing arrangements, courts apply
the per se rule, which does not investigate whether the arrangement, in fact, affects competition.
See, e.g., Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 399, 401, 436–38, 449 (2003). Yet although courts that evaluate licensing investigations under
the per se rule do not look at the effects on competition in the specific case, they assume that the
restriction is so onerous that the restrictions must affect competition. See J. Dianne Brinson, Patent
Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 359, 394 (1990) (stating that
under patent misuse’s per se rule, certain licensing practices are, without inquiry into circumstances
of use or economic consequences, presumed to seriously threaten competition).
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competitors from liability for patent infringement. For example, courts that
hold that a tie-in constitutes patent misuse prevent the patent owner’s
unjustifiable inhibition of competition in technologies that are related to
the patented invention. By defining the act as patent misuse and preventing
the patent owner from enforcing his patent, courts strengthen the patent
owner’s competitors under the assumption that competition will lower
prices, increase availability, and thereby enhance dissemination of these
related technologies.44 Hence, the law of patent misuse, like the law of
compulsory licensing, focuses primarily on the patent owner and his
competitors and embodies a simplistic view of the user as motivated by
availability and price alone.
II. THE USER AND THE DISSEMINATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Patent law doctrines focus on the actions of the patent owner and his
competitors. The goal of the doctrines is to ensure a low price and
increased availability of the technology. The assumption underlying these
laws is that technological dissemination is dependent on availability and
price alone. The market narrative presumes that once the price is lowered
and the technology is widely available, then the market will determine
which technology is worthy of adoption. Yet the market narrative is
lacking.45
This Part will uncover the important role of the ordinary user in
determining the fate of new technologies. It will also present a more
nuanced view of the user. It will show that the market narrative is lacking
because the ordinary user is not motivated by price and availability alone.
This Part reveals that there are many sources of motivation for the ordinary
user to resist a new technology. Specifically, this Part will categorize these
reasons into two broad categories: resistance due to novelty and resistance
due to the perceived consequences of the technology.
A. The Impact of the User’s Adoption Decision
Scholars recently looked beyond the inventor or creator to the role of
the user in influencing technological design. These scholars emphasize that
the user’s values and preferences shape the technology he uses. However,
these scholars do not focus on the ordinary user, but rather focus on the
44. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am., 283 U.S. at 33–34 (“The Dry Ice Corporation has no
right to be free from competition in the sale of solid carbon dioxide. Control over the supply of such
unpatented material is beyond the scope of the patentee’s monopoly; . . . . The present attempt is
analogous to the use of a patent as an instrument for restraining commerce.”).
45. See Joel Mokyr, The Political Economy of Technological Change: Resistance and
Innovation in Economic History, in TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 39, 39 (Maxine Berg & Kristine Bruland eds., 1998) (arguing that the market test is
often insufficient).
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creative user. They emphasize the role of the user as an innovator and his
influence on technological design.46
Indeed, the focus on the user as an innovator is an important step
toward illuminating the process of technological adoption. History is
replete with examples of users operating technologies differently than their
designers expected them to be used. Individuals may use a technology for a
different function than the inventors’ intended uses. For example, phone
companies originally promoted the telephone for use only as a business
tool. It was the users who transformed the telephone into a social tool.47
Yet the focus on the user as an innovator highlights only part of the crucial
role of the user in the dissemination process of new technologies. The user
can play a role as an innovator, but her role as a consumer determines the
fate of new technologies on a much more crucial and broader scale. The
user in her role as a potential consumer—even the couch potato—regularly
determines the fate of technological artifacts.48

46. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 70−72 (2005) (describing the
innovative user); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 951, 954 (2004) (showing that “copyright’s former consumers are now the creators, producers,
and disseminators of content”). See generally Benkler, supra note 18 (describing peer production
projects through which many individuals cooperate together to create); William W. Fisher III, The
Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010) (discussing legal conflicts
between user innovators and producers); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications
for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008) (distinguishing the user–innovator from the
prevailing conception of the seller–innovator in patent law and focusing on research tools
inventions). But see generally Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 347 (2005) (providing a broader conception of the user that she defines as “the situated
user”).
47. See Claude S. Fischer, “Touch Someone”: The Telephone Industry Discovers Sociability,
in TECHNOLOGY AND CHOICE: READINGS FROM TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 87, 88 (Marcel C.
Lafollette & Jeffrey K. Stine eds., 1991); Roger Silverstone, Eric Hirsch & David Morley,
Information and Communication Technologies and the Moral Economy of the Household, in
CONSUMING TECHNOLOGIES: MEDIA AND INFORMATION IN DOMESTIC SPACES 15, 19, 21−26 (Roger
Silverstone & Eric Hirsch eds., 1994). Users’ choices can also constrict the functions of a new
technology and those functions may disappear or change altogether. Id.
48. Consumption is important because it can also define identities and human relations. Even
in the most mundane process of integrating new technologies into the household, both artifacts and
people change and meanings are produced. The purchase of certain technologies could be central to
an individual’s or household’s efforts at self-creation and could affect the relationship between
members of the household and the outside world. For example, teenagers use their consumption of
music as a ticket into a peer group. See Merete Lie & Knut H. Sorensen, Making Technology Our
Own? Domesticating Technology into Everyday Life, in MAKING TECHNOLOGY OUR OWN?
DOMESTICATING TECHNOLOGY INTO EVERYDAY LIFE 1, 8−9 (Merete Lie & Knut H. Sorensen, eds.,
1996); Nelly Oudshoorn & Trevor Pinch, How Users and Non-Users Matter, in HOW USERS
MATTER: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF USERS AND TECHNOLOGIES 1, 12, 14 (Nelly Oudshoorn &
Trevor Pinch eds., 2003); Silverstone, Hirsch & Morley, supra note 47, at 15, 19, 21–26. For a
discussion of domestication, see generally Anne Sofie Laegran, Escape Vehicles? The Internet and
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The user, who influences the fate of a new technology in her basic
decision of whether to adopt it, may be a consumer, an employee within an
organization, the management of an organization, or a member of the
public whose actions affect the decisions of direct adopters. All these share
in common their crucial effect on the fate of a new technology. Hence, this
Article defines “user” broadly as a user or potential user who may choose
to adopt or reject a technology.
The user plays an important role in the adoption or rejection of a new
technology. Resistance to the adoption of new technologies takes many
forms. Behaviors constituting resistance to new technology include both
consciously motivated behavior and avoidance behavior. They include both
overt opposition and passive reluctance to use a technology.49 Individuals
who demonstrate against nuclear power are overt rejecters of a technology,
whereas passive rejecters include the woman who refuses to buy
genetically modified food in the supermarket and the aging writer who
refuses to substitute his typewriter for a computer and word processor. All
these forms of conduct affect the fate of a new technology.
User resistance to the adoption of new technologies may result in the
complete rejection of a new technology.50 For example, our computer
keyboard—QWERTY—is considered inferior to an alternative keyboard—
DVORAK—which users rejected.51 User resistance may also significantly
delay the adoption of a new technology. For example, artificial
insemination in humans was invented at the end of the eighteenth century,
but it reached mainstream adoption much later during the 1940s and
the Automobile in a Local-Global Intersection, in HOW USERS MATTER: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF
USERS AND TECHNOLOGIES, supra, at 81.
49. Some writers use narrower definitions of resistance. See Martin Bauer, Resistance to New
Technology and Its Effects on Nuclear Power, Information Technology and Biotechnology, in
RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 14–15 (Martin Bauer ed., 1995) (defining resistance to include only behavior
motivated by a purpose and not avoidance behavior); Dorothy Nelkin, Forms of Intrusion:
Comparing Resistance to Information Technology and Biotechnology in the USA, in RESISTANCE TO
NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra, at
379, 379 (focusing on overt opposition and excluding passive reluctance).
50. While this Article focuses on complete rejection of specific technologies, resistance could
take subtler forms, such as reluctance to learn about sophisticated uses of a video recorder, despite
still using its basic functions, or refraining from using a technology in certain ways, such as not
using personal data on a computer. See Ian Miles & Graham Thomas, User Resistance to New
Interactive Media: Participants, Processes and Paradigms, in RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY:
NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 255, 256.
51. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332
(1985); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 817 (1998).
But see generally S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1990) (arguing that use of the QWERTY keyboard is efficient and that users justifiably rejected the
DVORAK keyboard).
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1950s.52 Finally, certain population groups may refuse to adopt a
technology and thereby restrict dissemination. For example, some parents
reject childhood inoculation technology when they refuse to vaccinate their
children against childhood diseases due to fear that these inoculations may
cause autism.53
B. Factors Influencing the User’s Adoption Decision
Doubtless, price and availability of a technology are significant factors
in when or whether users adopt a technology. Price is also closely related
to the technology’s perceived relative advantage—the ratio of the expected
benefits and the costs of adoption in the eyes of the user. The technology’s
relative advantage is affected by: low price, economic profitability,
decrease in discomfort, social prestige, and savings of time and effort.54
Yet many additional factors influence the user’s willingness to adopt a
technology. The ordinary user is a multifaceted creature whose motivations
and complexities should be carefully examined because of his crucial
importance to the fate of new technologies. This section focuses on the
main reasons that lead to user resistance to the adoption of a new
technology.55 The dissemination process of a new technology may be
inhibited by one or a combination of these factors. Diverse groups of users
may resist the same technology for a different set of reasons. These reasons
can be divided into two categories: the novel nature of the technology and
the perceived consequences.
1. Novelty and User Resistance
Users resist technology because of its “newness.” Yet, their resistance
to “newness” is comprised of different reasons. First, some individuals
may resist the newness of the hardware or the process of the new
technology.56 For example, despite the advantages of electronic book
52. Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1049, 1060–83.
53. See Katherine Seligman, Vaccination Backlash: There’s a Small but Stubborn Faction of
Parents Who Don’t Vaccinate Their Children. Are There Risks?, S.F. CHRON. (May 25, 2003, 4:00
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Vaccination-Backlash-There-s-a-small-but-2645779.php
(describing a growing movement of parents who refuse to vaccinate their children); Sue Bennett,
The Shot Felt Round the World: Did an Immunization Trigger Your Child’s Autism?, AUTISM
COACH (Oct. 14, 2004), http://www.autismcoach.com/Articles.asp?ID=269 (reporting on a poll
surveying parents’ beliefs that vaccinations caused their children’s autism).
54. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DISSEMINATION OF INNOVATIONS 229–30, 233 (5th ed. 2003).
55. There are many factors that affect the adoption of new technologies. Additional factors
not discussed in detail are the triability of the invention (can it be tried on a limited basis?), its
observability (whether one sees others using it), users’ socioeconomic status, and users’ personality
traits. Id. at 258–59, 288–90.
56. See Bauer, supra note 49, at 19.
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readers such as the Kindle, the idea that paper books will become obsolete
deters many.57
Second, newness often entails complexity, and users may reject a
technology if they perceive it as relatively difficult to use. This is
particularly the case when a technology is incompatible with a preceding
idea. Old ideas are the main tools that people use to assess new ideas and
give them meaning.58 A historical example from the 1980s involves the
adoption process of home computers. Users went through periods of
frustration while they learned how to connect the computers and how to
run software. Although personal computers eventually became
commonplace in the American household, their perceived complexity was
an important negative force in their adoption rate in the 1980s. Eventually,
as home computers became more user friendly, their adoption rate
increased.59
A technology’s perceived complexity also inhibits adoption within
organizations. Bureaucracies function on routine and standard operating
procedures that resist change.60 For example, hospital personnel impeded
the transition from handwritten records to computerized electronic records.
The adoption of electronic records61 provides many advantages, which
include reductions in prescription errors due to illegible handwriting and
the ability for authorized physicians to access relevant information about
their patients no matter where the patients received previous treatment.62
Despite these advantages, training personnel to adjust to complex
systems is cumbersome. Medical providers and personnel need to adjust to
57. Sherman & Wright, supra note 4, at 28–29 (discussing concerns regarding the demise of
books and libraries). As of January 2014, 28% of adults in the United States reported reading an ebook in the previous year while 70% reported reading a book in print. The majority of the
population still prefers reading printed books despite a rise in use of e-readers. Katherine Zickuhr &
Lee Rainie, E-Reading Rises as Device Ownership Jumps, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT (Jan. 16,
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/01/16/e-reading-rises-as-device-ownership-jumps.
58. ROGERS, supra note 54, at 243–46.
59. Id. at 257–58.
60. See Joel Mokyr, Progress and Inertia in Technological Change, in CAPITALISM IN
CONTEXT: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE IN HONOR OF R.M.
HARTWELL 230, 236 (John A. James & Mark Thomas eds., 1994). The rate of adoption and nature of
adoption in organizations is different. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 221, 402–35.
61. Electronic health records generally have the following functionalities: display of health
information and data (including medical diagnoses, allergies, and medications a patient is taking);
result management (including laboratory test results and other treatment results); order entry and
management (including computerized medication orders, such as prescription orders that are not
handwritten); decisions support (including computer reminders that improve preventive care and
disease management); and electronic communication and connectivity (including integrating
medical records across treatment settings). Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 5, 108–09.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300jj-11(b) (2012) (listing the goals of electronic health records); Hoffman
& Podgurski, supra note 5, at 112–19 (describing the benefits of electronic health record systems).
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entering all the required data in the system’s preferred format and abandon
their own methods of keeping charts; they need to become proficient at
using the systems; and both patients and providers need to accommodate to
the central place that the computer takes during the physician–patient
interaction.63 Consequently, some physicians rebelled against the newly
installed systems and complained that the time required to use the
electronic systems distracts them from their medical duties.64
2. Perceived Consequences and User Resistance
Users may refrain from adopting a new technology because they are
concerned that the use of a technology will adversely affect either their
everyday well-being or will be incompatible with deeply held beliefs. User
resistance to the adoption of a new technology due to its perceived
consequences can be broken into two categories. First, users may resist
technological adoption due to perceived practical consequences, which
include both economic and noneconomic effects. Second, users may resist
technological adoption because of perceived consequences of the impact
on moral and religious values.
a. Practical Consequences
User resistance may stem from economic reasons. A primary economic
reason for resistance to new technology is a fear of loss of jobs. Workers
may fear that a new technology will render their skills obsolete.65 The
63. See Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records on
the Workplace, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 427–28 (2010) (discussing employers’ challenges
in implementing electronic health record systems in the workplace). See generally Richard J. Baron
& Elizabeth L. Fabens et al., Electronic Health Records: Just Around the Corner? Or Over the
Cliff?, 143 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 222 (2005) (describing one practice’s difficulties in adjusting to
an electronic health records system).
64. Ceci Connolly, Cedars-Sinai Doctors Cling to Pen and Paper, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2005, at A01 (describing staff rebellion at the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center that forced the Center to
shelve its new electronic record system after three months of use); Freudenheim, supra note 5
(describing resistance among physicians to the use of electronic health records systems). Resistance
to the adoption of electronic health record systems is not motivated by its complexity alone. Users
also resist these systems because of concerns over errors, the costs of purchase and implementation,
as well as privacy and security concerns. See David Blumenthal, Stimulating the Adoption of Health
Information Technology, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1477, 1477 (2009); Hoffman & Podgurski, supra
note 5, at 119–24.
65. See Joel Mokyr, Technological Inertia in Economic History, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 325, 330
(1992) [hereinafter Mokyr, Technological Inertia] (explaining that the more precise and valuable
the skill or equipment being replaced, the greater the owner’s incentive to resist the technology that
reduces its value); Joel Mokyr, The Political Economy of Technological Change: Resistance and
Innovation in Economic History, DEP’T OF ECON., NW. UNIV., 23–24 (Mar. 1997),
http://www.fsalazar.bizland.com/PYMES/Berg.pdf [hereinafter Mokyr, Political Economy of
Technological Change] (describing fears that machinery will displace labor and cause
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classic historical example involves the Luddites’ resistance to the
Industrial Revolution in England, which produced protests that culminated
in the breaking of machines. Workers feared that the machinery would
displace them.66 These concerns are not confined to the past. Today’s
electronic technology takes over many functions previously performed by
individuals. For example, lawyers fear that technology could render some
of their skills obsolete as new discovery software quickly scans for the
necessary information and rapidly achieves results that previously required
thousands of billable hours of work.67
Users and organizations may also hesitate before they adopt a new
technology due to sunk costs. Where investments and infrastructure already
accommodate a previous technology or an existing way of doing things, it
may prove more efficient to resist change.68 Particularly compelling is the
effect sunk costs have on current computer keyboard design. The computer
keyboard design used by most computer users is called QWERTY. Many,
in fact, believe that QWERTY is a suboptimal keyboard design.69 Its
arrangement of keys was selected to deal with an ancient technological
problem—the clashing of type bars on the typewriter—that was solved by
the nineteenth century.70 The DVORAK keyboard—designed to enable
more effective typing—was invented in 1932, but users reluctant to adjust
to a new typing method declined to adopt the new design. Existing users’
preferences repeatedly outweighed those of new users for whom it would
have been more efficient to adopt the DVORAK design.71
unemployment). Technological change may also threaten nonpecuniary characteristics of labor by
changing a physical work environment or transforming labor hierarchies. Laborers also resist these
changes. See Mokyr, supra note 60, at 236.
66. For literature on the Luddite resistance, see generally BRIAN BAILEY, THE LUDDITE
REBELLION (1998); Adrian Randall, Reinterpreting ‘Luddism’: Resistance to New Technology in the
British Industrial Revolution, in RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 57; Mokyr, supra note 65, at 329–30. See
also ADRIAN RANDALL, BEFORE THE LUDDITES: CUSTOM, COMMUNITY AND MACHINERY IN THE
ENGLISH WOOLEN INDUSTRY, 1776–1809, at 4, 41–68 (1991) (examining the pre-Luddite period and
showing that the woolen cloth industry in England between the 1770s and 1809 resisted machinery
when it threatened employment or relocated workers into a new factory based system).
67. John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/science/05legal.html; see also KIRKPATRICK
SALE, REBELS AGAINST THE FUTURE 223–28 (1995) (discussing post-World War II concerns of labor
displacements).
68. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 139 (1999).
69. For an explanation and history of the DVORAK keyboard, see The DVORAK Keyboard,
MIT, http://www.mit.edu/~jcb/Dvorak/ (last visited June 11, 2014).
70. Id.
71. See David, supra note 51, at 332, 335–36; Gillette, supra note 51, at 817. But see
generally Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 51 (arguing that use of the QWERTY keyboard is
efficient and that users justifiably rejected the DVORAK keyboard).
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Finally, users may believe a technology confers a reduced advantage
due to its failure to attain critical mass. Interactive technologies can be
prone to market failure because they are often characterized by “network
effects.”72 Network effects exist in markets where the value an individual
places on a good increases as others use the good. Once a critical mass of
people use a particular technology, its rate of adoption accelerates.73 Thus,
reaching a critical mass is imperative for the adoption of many interactive
technologies.74 A classic example of a technology dependent on network
effects is the Internet. The value of the Internet is a function of the number
of people who connect to it.75 The Internet reached its critical mass point in
1990 with four million users worldwide.76 Vendors and information
providers found the Internet more lucrative as more people were online. At
a certain point most offline businesses realized they had to offer an online
service because a large percentage of their clientele transferred their
purchasing activity online. In addition, when a technology reaches its
critical mass, then people are less likely to abandon use of the technology
because they become dependent on it.77 For example, in 2014, it is more
costly for an individual to stop using Facebook unilaterally than it was for
a Facebook user seven years earlier.78
Individuals may resist new technologies due to other noneconomic
practical consequences. Throughout history, individuals have resisted
many new technologies that they believed threatened community health
and common resources. Examples of resistance include protests against
72. See Gillette, supra note 51, at 818.
73. See id. at 817–18.
74. Goods that do not have network effects have demand curves that slope downwards, that
is, as price decreases consumer demand increases. However, goods that have network effects feature
a different demand curve. The willingness of individuals to pay for the good increases as the
number of goods expected to be sold grows and, therefore, price may increase instead of decreasing.
See generally Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network Size with
Application to the US Fax Market 4–6 (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus., Research Paper Ser. No. EC95-11), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-11.pdf. It should be noted, however,
that the presumed increasing returns might not be the only effects at work because eventually other
preferences may also affect choices. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 343–45; Mark Lemley &
William McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 497
(1998).
75. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1257, 1281 (1998).
76. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 343–44, 346–47.
77. See id. at 343–44; M. Lynne Markus, Toward a “Critical Mass” Theory of Interactive
Media, in ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 194, 194, 197 (Janet Fulk & Charles
Steinfield eds., 1990).
78. See Randall Stross, Getting Older Without Getting Old, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2010, at
BU4; Facebook Users in the World: Facebook Usage and Facebook Growth Statistics, INTERNET
WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm (last visited June 1, 2014) (noting
the increased growth of Facebook users, reaching 835 million users in March of 2012).
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nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal, and chemicals.79 Feared risks
to personal or family health also played an important role in persuading
individuals to refuse using new technologies. For example, consumers’
refusal to purchase genetically modified food also stems from concerns of
risks to personal or family health and harmful effects to the environment.80
Similarly, a vocal movement of parents refuses to vaccinate their children
due to concerns that autism is linked to certain childhood vaccinations.81
Other concerns that relate neither to health nor community well-being
affect users’ willingness to adopt a new technology. Fear of discrimination
can play a role in the rejection of a new technology. For example, despite
the growing availability of genetic testing, studies show that many
individuals decide not to undergo testing due to fear of insurance and
employment discrimination.82
b. Impact on Moral and Religious Values
Potential users may reject a technology due to cultural, moral, social, or
religious reasons.83 Historical and current examples are plentiful. The
79. See generally Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of
Chemical Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 285 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) (discussing and comparing
public and expert perceptions of risks in chemicals); Allan Mazur, Opposition to Technological
Innovation, 13 MINERVA 58, 60–61 (1975) (showing that a perception of danger provoked popular
opposition to both nuclear plants and the fluoridation of water supplies); Paul Slovic et al.,
Perceived Risk, Trust and the Politics of Nuclear Waste, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra, at 275
(describing public opposition to nuclear waste disposal). On perceptions of risk of technology, see
generally MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION
OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Judith A. Bradbury, The Policy Implications
of Differing Concepts of Risk, 14 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 380 (1989).
80. See ALLAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA’S PICNIC BASKET: THE POTENTIAL AND HAZARDS OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 104–28 (2000) (discussing and addressing Europeans’ health and
environmental concerns regarding genetically modified foods); Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety
Regulation in the European Union and the United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525, 527−29 (1998) (describing Europeans’ opposition to genetically modified
foods); Gregory N. Mandel, The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication, 23 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 89–92 (2006) (discussing health and environmental concerns regarding
genetically modified food).
81. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting
Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 388–90 (2004) (pointing to fear
of autism as one of the motivators of the antivaccination movement); Jane E. Brody, Vaccines and
Autism, Beyond the Fear Factors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at F7 (reporting on concerns that
mercury in vaccines causes autism); Gardiner Harris, Measles Cases Grow in Number, and Officials
Blame Parents’ Fear of Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at A16 (reporting on an increase in
measles cases due to parents’ concerns of a link between the measles vaccine and autism, despite
evidence to the contrary).
82. Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and
Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 255−64 (2006).
83. See DEGREGORI, supra note 10, at xi (explaining that some people will not use
technologies because their belief systems forbid it); DAVID ELLIOTT & RUTH ELLIOTT, THE CONTROL
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Amish community is best known for its religious opposition to technology.
The Amish are a Christian religious sect that objects to the use of many
technologies. To this day, they travel with horses and carriages and refuse
to use electricity and common household appliances.84 Other religious
groups oppose the use of reproductive technologies. For example, in 2008,
the Vatican affirmed the Catholic Church’s opposition to use of different
forms of reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilization, based
on the belief that every human life, including that of an embryo, is sacred.85
Other possible users may resist certain technologies due to fear that they
destabilize important moral and social values. For example, the desire to
preserve the uniqueness of human identity and to preserve human dignity
motivates opposition to diverse technologies. During the 1970s and 1980s
as computers became prevalent, studies revealed that some individuals
resisted computer usage because they feared the idea of an autonomous
entity’s ability to perform the functions of human thought, and thereby
downgrade man’s previously unique significance in the order of things.86
Similar fears inspire resistance to robots that can replace human
functions.87
More recently, a different version of the argument was made to oppose
human cloning. Objectors to human cloning argued that the replication of
OF TECHNOLOGY vii, 10 (1976) (arguing that the choice of one technology over another is based on a

society’s scheme of values and priorities, which include cultural and religious beliefs); ROGERS,
supra note 54, at 241–42, 249 (describing studies finding that incompatibility with values and
beliefs is an obstacle to technological adoption); MOKYR, supra note 10, at 173–76 (tying societies’
technological progress to their value systems); Joel Mokyr, Technological Inertia, supra note 65, at
327 (stating that historically, cultural and religious elements may have a big influence on
technological decision-making). But see generally Jacques Ellul, The Technological Order, in
PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGY 86, 86
(Carl Mitcham & Robert Mackey eds., 1972) (arguing that technology is determinative and
autonomous of social values).
84. See generally Lee J. Zook, Slow-Moving Vehicles, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE 145
(Donald B. Kraybill ed., 1993) (describing reasons for the Amish’s use of horses and carriages in
lieu of modern vehicles); Jameson M. Wetmore, Amish Technology: Reinforcing Values and
Building Community, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG. Summer 2007, at 10, available at
http://archive.cspo.org/documents/Wetmore-AmishTechnology-v2.pdf (describing Amish decisionmaking regarding technological adoption).
85. See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE
ON CERTAIN BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS (2008), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congre
gations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-personae_en.html.
86. Robert S. Lee, Social Attitudes and the Computer Revolution, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 53, 53,
56–57 (1970).
87. See SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND
LESS FROM EACH OTHER 23–147 (2011) (underscoring concerns regarding robots fulfilling human
functions).
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humans will undermine the uniqueness of individual identity, pose
psychological problems for the cloned individuals, and generally erode
human dignity.88
The desire to preserve the uniqueness of human identity is only one
social value that often stands in the way of the adoption of new
technologies. Another example is the traditional social value of the family
as a nuclear unit, which consists of a mother, father, and child who are
genetically related. The technology of artificial insemination introduced the
ability to produce a child with donor sperm. For over 150 years, society
resisted this technology because, since children who were not genetically
related to their fathers could now be born, it destabilized the traditional
concept of the nuclear, genetically related family.89
III. THE MARKET GOVERNANCE RULE
While the law regulates the invention of new technologies through the
patent system, the prevailing wisdom is that the market should determine
which technologies society eventually adopts.90 Advocates of market
88. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or an Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 247, 256 (1998) (stating that “[p]ersonal identity is at the heart of objections to human
cloning”); Dan W. Brock, Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and
Con, in CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 141, 150–55 (Martha
C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998) (discussing the argument that human cloning violates
the right to a unique identity); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1371, 1410 (1998) (discussing opposition to human cloning because it violates human dignity
and identity); THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN
ETHICAL INQUIRY (2002), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/cloningreport/
children.html (discussing problems of identity and individuality for the cloned child); Gina Kolata,
Ethics Panel Recommends a Ban on Human Cloning, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/08/us/ethics-panel-recommends-a-ban-on-human-cloning.html
(reporting that the National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended that President Clinton
continue the moratorium on the use of federal funding to support human cloning).
89. See generally Bernstein, supra note 3 (describing the social adoption process of the
technology of artificial insemination).
90. See Helge Godo, Technological Evolution, Innovation and Human Agency, in DIVERSITY
IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: HETEROGENEITY, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
18, 31–32 (Elias G. Carayannis & Aris Kaloudis eds., 2008); Maggie Mahar, Irrational Exuberance
over Electronic Medical Records?, HEALTH BEAT BLOG (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.healthbeatblog.org/2008/12/irrational-exuberance-over-electronic-medical-records-.ht
ml (quoting Dr. Rick Peters, founder and former CEO of Oceania, an early enterprise of electronic
health records, who stated, “[T]he organizations set up by industry and the government to mandate
standards . . . stifle innovation and . . . keep health care IT completely out of step with the general
computer industry”); Tom Stricker, Comment to Sizing Up Obama’s Fuel Economy Standards,
NAT’L J. EXPERT BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011, 5:42 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/201109280058
36/http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2011/08/sizing-up-obamas-fuel-economy.php#2038012 (“Any
company relying on favorable regulatory structure to succeed is missing the bigger picture, namely,
that long-term success will ultimately shine on companies that meet customer demands at an
affordable price.”).
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governance believe that would-be adopters, whether individuals or
corporations, will select the superior technology. As long as technologies
are available on the free market, they maintain that the market will
determine the optimal result for technological progress.91 Proponents of
market governance point to the hazards of government action. Particularly,
they underscore the difficulty of distinguishing between user resistance that
protects society from costly duds and resistance that hinders progress.92
Given some time, they argue, technologies that are advantageous to the
consumer are likely to flourish and government action will be
unnecessary.93
This Part highlights the problems of relying solely on market
governance. First, some very beneficial technologies incur significant
delays before their eventual adoption. Second, market governance is, in
fact, an illusion. The government at all levels—federal, state, and local—
already acts to encourage user adoption. Yet, it does so in an inconsistent
and piecemeal manner.
A. The Costs of Delay and Nonintervention
The appeal of allowing the market to determine the adoption of new
technologies lies, at least partly, in its deceptive appearance of neutrality.
Market choice may seem the natural state of events, but the decision to let
the market control and to refrain from government action is itself an active
choice, not necessarily a natural result.94 Moreover, this choice carries with
it a cost. Superior technologies that are available for use at times undergo
lengthy social adoption processes or are resisted altogether.95 A lengthy
delay or complete rejection of an important technology undermines the
overall goal of the intellectual property system—the promotion of progress.
This is especially disconcerting because often it is the more radical
inventions to which markets are particularly hostile.96
Of course, not every rejected technology reduces human welfare and
inhibits progress. Nuclear weapons are a paramount example of a
91. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–86
(Harper & Brothers 2d ed. 1947) (describing the process of creative destruction).
92. See Mokyr, Technological Inertia, supra note 65, at 328 (stating that this problem is not
easily resolved).
93. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 623–35.
94. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 10 (2008) (stating that it is a misconception “that it is possible to avoid
influencing people’s choices”).
95. See generally Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362–65
(2010) (arguing that at least half of patented inventions in the United States are never commercially
exploited).
96. See Godo, supra note 90, at 18, 32 (stating that while certain technologies, particularly
incremental technologies, may be more effectively governed by the markets, markets are particularly
hostile to radical innovations warranting government action).
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technology without which many believe our world would be better off
without. And some rejected technologies are, doubtless, unneeded
innovations.97 Yet there are still plenty of examples of technologies that
initially met social rejection only to be socially endorsed decades and even
centuries later. Again, artificial insemination in humans serves as an
example. Although many believe that the reproductive technology of
artificial insemination in humans is a product of late twentieth century
science, evidence of its existence was first recorded as early as the late
eighteenth century.98 Artificial insemination technology can overcome
infertility by using a syringe-type instrument to insert the sperm of the
husband or donor into the woman.99 Yet despite the procedure’s simplicity
and its need by many childless couples, the first reports of significant
social use emerged only in the 1930s and 1940s.100 The costs of market
governance are particularly evident when a new technology eventually
becomes widespread, as was artificial insemination by the 1960s and
1970s,101 but fails to benefit generations of potential users. In the case of
artificial insemination, the cost was many infertile individuals who
remained childless in the more than 150 years it took the procedure to
become socially accepted.
B. The Illusion of Market Control
Although many believe that the current system is one of market control,
the government actually intervenes to encourage user adoption in multiple
ways, many of them subtle and unnoticed by the casual observer.102 A
current example involves the adoption of electronic health records by
hospitals and private physician clinics. The government, in an effort to
encourage adoption, undertook a variety of measures to encourage the
process.103
First, the government offered financial incentives to doctors and
hospitals in the form of extra Medicare payments for the “meaningful use”
of electronic health record systems. The government offered the highest
payments for 2011 adopters and will gradually reduce payments until
they’re phased out in 2016. The government’s goal was to incentivize rapid
adoption by offering the highest incentives to the earliest adopters.104
97. See, e.g., Tynan, supra note 11 (describing the reasons for the failure of twenty-five
technology products).
98. Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1048–49.
99. Id. at 1037, 1049–50.
100. Id. at 1060.
101. Id. at 1083–84.
102. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 582 (stating that “[f]or our country’s entire history,
government action—both direct and indirect—has affected what technologies will be adopted”).
103. Blumenthal, supra note 64, at 1478 (describing the government’s measures to encourage
adoption of electronic health records).
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395W-4(o) (2012).
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Second, the government instituted a set of penalties for physicians and
hospitals that do not use electronic health records systems meaningfully by
2015. Physicians will lose 1% of their Medicare fees in 2015 and the
penalties escalate for each additional year of nonuse. Hospitals also face
cuts in Medicare fees for failure to adopt these systems.105 Third, the
government instituted a support structure for the installation of electronic
health records systems. The law provides funds to create regional
technology extension centers to help providers install the systems106 and
train their workforces to use them.107 It also provides support for
educational programs for health care professional training through
curriculum development and student recruitment.108 Finally, the
government acted to alleviate security and privacy fears. It required health
care professionals and associated parties to promptly notify patients of a
breach in the security of their electronic personal information.109 Further, it
extended Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA)
protections to health care providers and associated parties who deal with
electronic health records.110
Similarly, the government engaged in a variety of methods to encourage
adoption of new payment systems. Professors Erik Lillquist and Sarah
Waldeck provide a rich study of government action to encourage adoption
of novel payment systems.111 First, the government provided the public
with information to convince it to use new payment systems. For example,
to promote public recognition and acceptance of electronic copies of
checks, the government required that the electronic copies bear the legend:
“This is a legal copy of your check. You can use it the same way you
would use the original check.”112 The government also addressed public
concerns over new payment systems. For instance, as the public began to
use credit cards in the 1960s, concerns about theft and unauthorized
charges accompanied the introduction of the cards. The government
alleviated these fears by limiting cardholder responsibility to no more than
fifty dollars of fraudulent charges and enacting criminal penalties for
fraudulent credit card use.113 Further, the government granted incentives
and imposed sanctions to support new payment systems. For example, the
Transit Authority in New York City encouraged use of the Metro card by
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 1395W-4(a)(7)(A)(i).
Id. § 300jj-32(c).
Id. § 300jj-34(e)(3).
Id. §§ 300jj-35–36.
Id. §§ 17932, 17937.
Id. §§ 300jj-19, 17934, 17938.
See generally Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3.
12 U.S.C. § 5003(b)(2) (2012); Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 608.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1643–1644 (2012); Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 612–13.
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offering free bus transfers to Metro card users.114 Finally, the government
ensured the adoption of new payment technologies by eliminating or
severely curtailing the competition. For example, in 1863 the United States
issued national bank notes, which faced stiff competition from state bank
notes. Congress placed a 10% tax on state banknotes, thus making them
prohibitively expensive and resulting in their elimination.115
IV. GOVERNMENT ACTION TO ENCOURAGE USER ADOPTION
This Part highlights the importance of an institutional actor that will
articulate and implement systematic guidelines to encourage user adoption.
It relies on Professors Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai’s work, which
underscores the need to create an Office of Innovation Policy. This type of
institutional actor could supervise the implementation of user adoption
guidelines by different government agencies. This Article proposes that the
guidelines should identify when government action is warranted and when
it is not. The guidelines should incorporate action through gentle nudges
and refrain from coercive action to encourage user adoption. Moreover, the
government should limit its action to encouragement of a class of
technologies and should not differentiate between competing technologies.
Finally, this Part addresses the tension between this proposal and patent
law’s rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine.
A. An Institutional Coordinator
The goal of our technology-regulating regime is to promote progress,
and this objective is strongly tied to the dissemination of new
technologies.116 User adoption is vital to achieve technological
dissemination. Yet policymakers give little systematic thought to the issue
of user adoption. Admittedly, patent law incorporates some provisions that
attempt to encourage user adoption by encouraging competition. However,
patent law addresses only a small part of the spectrum of user resistance.
And, again, while government action targeted at other aspects of user
114. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 614.
115. Id. at 620–21.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally David S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest in
Promoting the Progress of Science: Constitutional Constraints on Copyright Laws, 64 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 185, 187–92 (2011) (arguing that the framers intended the progress clause to
promote the creation and dissemination of knowledge); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed
to Promote? Defining “Progress” in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001) (arguing that
progress under the constitutional provision incorporates dissemination). On the interpretation of the
term “progress” in the intellectual property clause, see generally Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the
Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006).
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resistance occurs on a broad scale on all government levels—federal, state,
and local117—it occurs in a piecemeal and inconsistent way.118
An institutional actor charged with promulgating and implementing
guidelines to encourage user adoption could provide a systematic and
consistent way to address user adoption issues for patented and unpatented
technologies alike. The goal of guidelines developed to target user
adoption is not to set a norm of government intervention. In fact, some
technologies are unsuccessful and users legitimately resist them.119 Instead,
the objective of these guidelines should be to identify when a technology
warrants government action and when it does not as well as the best ways
to achieve user adoption. These principles would improve coherency and
consistency in an important area that has thus far received little attention.
Under the current regime, government action to encourage user
adoption is highly decentralized. A shift toward more centralization
requires institutional change. Detailed institutional design is beyond the
scope of this Article, but the following discussion relies on the important
work done by Professors Benjamin and Rai on this topic. Benjamin and
Rai make a compelling case for the creation of an Office of Innovation
Policy.120 Although they do not address the issue of user adoption, they
define innovation broadly to include dissemination through putting the
invention into productive use.121
Benjamin and Rai suggest that the creation of a new Office of
Innovation Policy can address the problem of different governmental
agencies pursuing innovation strategies that are in tension, if not even

117. See supra text accompanying notes 106–17.
118. See supra Part III.
119. See, e.g., Tynan, supra note 11.
120. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 2. Another potential candidate is the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), but the PTO currently lacks substantive rulemaking authority on
patentability issues, such as subject matter or nonobviousness, which it decides on a daily basis. See
Arti Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2053 (2009). Although recent proposals emphasize
the need to expand the PTO’s authority, it is unlikely that the government will expand its authority
beyond the grant of patents to formulate and enforce rules to regulate user adoption. For proposals
to expand the PTO’s authority, see generally Sichelman, supra note 95, at 400–10 (proposing that
the PTO should issue a commercialization patent in exchange for a commitment to commercialize a
product not available in the marketplace); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1747 (2011) (arguing for the need to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority); John
Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (2011) (arguing
for the need to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority for issues of patentable subject
matter); Jonathan Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (arguing for the need to grant
the PTO substantive rulemaking authority).
121. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 2. (defining innovation policy as focusing on
promoting “the creation and diffusion of technology”).
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contradictory to each other.122 They propose an executive entity that would
have some authority to push agencies in a way that will promote
innovation.123
Benjamin and Rai’s proposal strikes an important balance between
centralization and decentralization. They emphasize that centralization
allows for efficiency, coordination, clarity, and interorganizational
learning, but at the possible cost of bad decision-making.124
Since government agencies such as the Federal Drug Administration
and the Federal Communications Commission have specialized
knowledge, which is valuable for informed decision-making, Benjamin and
Rai do not advocate an Office of Innovation Policy with the power to
block.125 Instead, they suggest a “Hard Look Review” regime under which
agencies are obliged to consider all arguments, even those that do not
correspond with their position, and respond publicly to the Office of
Innovation Policy’s position. At the same time, the specialized government
agencies are not obligated to implement the Office of Innovation Policy’s
position.126
Although not specifically envisioned under Benjamin and Rai’s
scheme, an Office of Innovation Policy-type agency could also promulgate
user adoption guidelines and enforce them under the mechanisms those
authors propose. This could improve systematic thought and resolve
coordination and inconsistencies regarding action intended to encourage
user adoption. Furthermore, it could also alleviate the problem of capture.
Currently, decisions regarding government action to encourage user
adoption are often made by specialized agencies, state or local
governments. Benjamin and Rai explain that capture is more likely to
occur when an agency covers one or two industries and less likely when it
has a broader scope.127 Hence, overview by an Office of Innovation Policytype agency is likely to reduce capture concerns as well.
B. Gentle Nudges
Advocates of market governance argue that while the market will select
successful technologies that offer a significant advantage, the government
122. Id. at 4 (“Even when U.S. government entities like federal agencies and courts actually
focus on innovation, they generally act without having much awareness of what other institutions
faced with similar problems have done—much less coordinating with those institutions. Improving
the awareness and coordination of innovation-related activities among federal agencies and courts
could be tremendously helpful.”).
123. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 10, at 6.
124. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 8.
125. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 10, at 58, 63.
126. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 11–12.
127. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 10, at 58, 78–79.
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may force upon society technological failures. Technological failures may
be technologies that do not offer a significant advantage or technologies
that are inferior to other technologies. Particularly, the government may be
quick to adopt the first prototype of a new class of technologies and make
it less likely that individuals will invent or users will adopt more
sophisticated embodiments later on. To address these concerns, this Article
proposes that the government act through gentle nudges to encourage user
adoption and refrain from coercive action that prevents society from
choosing to adopt a specific technology.128 In addition, the proposal is to
limit government action to encourage the adoption of new categories of
technology. It does not suggest that the government should intervene to
encourage one version of a particular technology over another.
Law and social norms scholars distinguish between gentle nudges and
harsh shoves.129 Harsh shoves force change by eliminating or curtailing the
older technology or mandating the adoption of a new technology to
perform a previously non-technological function. The adoption of digital
television is an example of a harsh shove. The government required all
full-power television stations to broadcast exclusively in digital format as
of June 12, 2009.130 Consequently, the public had to either purchase a
digital television set or connect their television to an analog-to-digital
converter. In essence, the government eliminated the option of analog
broadcasting to promote digital broadcasting.131 The public did not have
the option to decide whether they believed digital broadcasting was, in fact,
superior and worthy of adoption.
To compare, there are many different forms of gentle nudges. The goal
of this Article is not to provide a full survey of potential gentle nudges but
to illustrate some significant examples. Patent law already incorporates
some gentle nudges through compulsory licensing and patent misuse laws.
This proposal seeks to expand the range of gentle nudges the technologyregulating regime offers to address the complexities of user resistance.
First, the government may offer information about a new technology132
by, for example, facilitating or funding training, as it is currently doing to

128. But cf. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 623–35 (arguing that government action,
whether through gentle nudges or hard shoves, is generally inadvisable).
129. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 5–6 (explaining that gentle nudges influence
people’s choices while still letting them opt out); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:
Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 619–20 (2000) (defining gentle nudges
as less condemnatory norms than harsh shoves).
130. The Switch to Digital Television (DTV) is Coming, DTVANSWERS.COM,
http://www.dtvanswers.com/toolkit/DTVQ&Aj.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
131. Id.
132. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 608–12; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note
94, at 190–91.
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encourage the adoption of electronic health information systems.133 The
government could also offer information through an advertisement
campaign. Second, the government may take action to alleviate concerns
about a particular technology. The government can reduce fears that
surround a technology through legislation, as the government did when it
enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 partly to
alleviate fears of genetic discrimination.134 The government can also ease
concerns through an advertisement campaign. For example, when the
government wanted to convince the public to take the swine flu vaccine, it
used a massive advertising campaign to emphasize that the vaccine does
not carry any hazardous side effects.135 Third, the government may provide
incentives to induce individuals to adopt a new technology and also
enforce sanctions against those who refuse to adopt the technology. As
illustrated previously, physicians and hospitals that timely adopt electronic
health records systems will receive incentives in the form of additional
Medicare payments, while those that resist adoption will eventually lose
part of their Medicare compensation.136
Gentle nudges, as opposed to harsh shoves, facilitate user adoption
only; they do not coerce social acceptance. Even a collection of gentle
nudges, like in the case of electronic health records, does not amount to a
harsh shove. A nudge is not a shove as long as a user may still choose not
to adopt a technology. The government is less likely to lock society into
use of an inferior technology through gentle nudges that do not coerce
adoption. Regardless of incentives, sanctions, advertising, training,
information, and reduction of concerns, the public is unlikely to adopt a
technology that does not confer a significant relative advantage.137 In a
sense, government action through gentle nudges to encourage user
adoption is similar to the government’s role in the encouragement of
innovation through the grant of patents. The hope of getting a patent
encourages innovative activity. In addition, the grant of a patent can

133. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300jj-35–36 (2012).
134. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881; Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 471–74 (2010).
135. Paul Joseph Watson, Government Appoints Task Force to Handle H1N1 Vaccine
Propaganda, PRISONPLANET.COM (Nov. 2, 2009, 11:45 AM), http://www.prisonplanet.com/govern
ment-appoints-task-force-to-handle-h1n1-vaccine-propaganda.html.
136. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395W-4(a)(7), (o).
137. Professors Thaler and Sunstein describe gentle nudges as a form of “libertarian
paternalism.” Gentle nudges influence people’s choices though gentle nudges still leave them the
option to opt out. A nudge alters people’s behavior in a predictable way but does not forbid any
options. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 4–6.
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facilitate innovation because it signals the worth of the invention.138 Yet
the patent system does not guarantee that a specific innovation will
succeed. It merely provides a gentle nudge.
Admittedly, although a gentle nudge is less likely to lead to the
adoption of an inferior technology, there is still some risk that this may
occur. This risk is inevitable, though, and it accompanies technological
adoption processes dominated by the market as well. For example, users
did not adopt the superior DVORAK keyboard over QWERTY because of
sunk costs. Users were unwilling to invest the time and training required to
adjust to a new typing system.139
Finally, this Article suggests that the government should act through
gentle nudges only where it seeks to encourage the adoption of a new class
of technology. An example of intervention to encourage use of a class of
technology is the government’s use of feed-in tariffs to subsidize use of
solar energy. Users who install solar panels connected to the electrical grid
receive subsidized payments for the electricity the panels generate.140 The
government’s goal through this program is to encourage use of solar energy
generally and not to advocate the use of a specific type of solar panel.141
This is distinguished from government action to encourage the adoption of
one of several competing technologies, as in the encouragement of the use
of one drug over another where both operate in a similar fashion and
achieve a similar result.142
For two reasons, this Article proposes to limit government action to the
encouragement of a class of technology rather than the promotion of one
competing technology over another. First, government action is justified as
a means to overcome user resistance. User resistance, for the variety of
reasons discussed—novelty of hardware or process; novelty due to
complexity; concerns about practical consequences such as loss of jobs,
sunk costs, effects on personal health and the environment; and pressures
on moral and religious values—generally does not rise when users select
between competing technologies. User resistance usually occurs when
138. For a discussion on the expressive function of the patent system, see generally Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 575–77, 594–97 (2006).
139. See generally David, supra note 51; Gillette, supra note 51, at 817. But see Liebowitz &
Margolis, supra note 51 (arguing that use of the QWERTY keyboard is efficient and that users
justifiably rejected the DVORAK keyboard).
140. David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, The Role of Feed-In Tariffs in Supporting the
Expansion of Solar Energy Production, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 943, 969–72 (2010) (describing states’
initiatives using the feed-in-tariff mechanism).
141. See id. at 944–46.
142. Admittedly, at times it may be hard to determine when a technology constitutes a separate
class and when it is merely a competitor to another technology, but often the distinction is clear. For
example, the Internet is clearly a separate class of technology, while Google+ and Facebook are
without doubt competitor social network technologies.
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users face a truly transformative technology—a new category of
technology. Conversely, when users adopt one technology, they are
unlikely to resist its competitors due to fear of novelty or consequences.
Therefore, government action is particularly justified to encourage the
adoption of a new category of technology where lack of adoption is more
likely to result from user resistance.
At the same time, user resistance does come up between competing
technologies in one instance. This is where a technology requires critical
mass. For example, Google+ currently struggles to lure users from
Facebook in order to create a critical mass of users. Government action to
select between competitors in such a case remains inappropriate in light of
the general goals of the technology-regulating regime, which seeks to
encourage dissemination in order to promote progress. Thus, dissemination
of a new class of technology serves its overall goal, but distinguishing
between competitors who offer different versions of the same technology
does not impact the progress goal.143
C. The Moral Utility Objection
An important objection to the incorporation of user adoption guidelines
into our technology-regulating regime is that it contradicts the rejection of
the Moral Utility Doctrine. Patent owners must satisfy the utility
requirement in order to attain a patent—they must show that their patent is
useful.144 In the past, moral utility was part of the general utility decision.
The law considered whether an invention was “frivolous or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”145 Thus, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts evaluated the potential
detrimental effects of an invention on society when they determined
whether they should grant a patent for an invention. However, in recent
years, patent law has rejected the Moral Utility Doctrine and refused to
consider whether an invention is immoral or illegal.146

143. One could argue that one version of the technology is so superior to another that its
promotion over competitors does, in fact, promote progress. Yet it may be that in this case the
technologies are not actually competing technologies, but the superior technology is in essence a
new category of technology, even if it accomplishes similar functions as other technologies on the
market. For example, most would agree that while both the VCR and the DVD accomplish the same
function—enabling entertainment consumption at one’s own leisure—they are not competing
technologies, but different categories of technologies.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).
145. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
146. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). But see
Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention Creation Activity Boundary in Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY
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The incorporation of principles to encourage user adoption into the
technology-regulating regime will bring back the “social effects” question
that was reflected in the moral utility analysis. Government agencies will
need to determine whether the social effects of an invention require
government action. It may, therefore, appear at first blush to contradict the
rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine. However, the differences between
user adoption and moral utility decisions underscore that charging the
government with user adoption decisions is not necessarily inconsistent
with the rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine.
First, the moral utility decision is relevant to the early stages in the life
of a technology. The PTO decides whether to encourage the invention and
application to practice of a technology that may be immoral and injurious,
or a court may later invalidate a patent because the PTO should not have
granted the patent in the first place. Where a technology is at its invention
or application to practice stage, its potential effects on society are less
clear. An early decision that an invention is immoral and should not
receive a patent because it does not meet the utility requirement may close
unknown opportunities and preclude other potential uses for the
technology.147 Conversely, user adoption decisions are usually made when
the patented invention is already in the market and its potential uses are
better known. Thus, it decreases the risk of an erroneous decision.
Second, objectors to the Moral Utility Doctrine warn that the doctrine
would deter inventors with controversial inventions from filing patents,
which would have negative economic effects.148 This argument is
irrelevant to user adoption decisions because these decisions take place
later in the process—after the technology is invented and patented.
Furthermore, while the Moral Utility Doctrine penalizes a technology when
it denies patent protection, user adoption encouragement singles out a
technology for a positive reward. The Moral Utility Doctrine will not affect
competitors because government action should apply to a category of
technology, not to a specific competitor. Thus, government action to
encourage user adoption is unlikely to deter inventors. The opposite may in
fact be true; inventors may be induced to increase their efforts if they
believe their invention is truly revolutionary and could gain governmental
support.

L. REV. 577, 591–97 (2009) (describing an international trend toward consideration of morality in
invention creation activity).
147. Although a court may invalidate the patent later when more information is available, the
basis for its decision is that the PTO should not have granted a patent in the first place because at
the time of the invention there was no known utility.
148. Benjamin D. Enerson, Note, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The
Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 715 (2004).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/7

34

Bernstein: Incentivizing the Ordinary User

2014]

INCENTIVIZING THE ORDINARY USER

1309

Finally, objectors to the Moral Utility Doctrine argue that the PTO is
ill-equipped to make determinations regarding the social effects of diverse
technologies.149 Again, this argument does not apply to the incorporation
of user adoption principles into the law. These principles would help to
create a systemized and consistent law to encourage user adoption, but the
PTO would not implement them. The implementation would remain under
the auspices of specialized agencies, Congress, and state and local
governments.
V. INSTIGATORS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION
Government action is not the only way to overcome user resistance, nor
is it always warranted. Promoters of new technologies will often try to
overcome resistance in order to be successful in the marketplace.
Particularly, they often work to overcome resistance due to novel
complexity. Their efforts may include design changes to simplify the
technology and advertisement campaigns that emphasize the ease of use.150
In other instances, society may require a considerable adjustment time that
precludes a hasty adoption. This is often the case where resistance is a
result of pressures on moral or social values. Finally, some inventions may
be unsuccessful technologies, without which society is better off.
The goal of this Part is to take a preliminary step to identify situations
in which government action is particularly justified. These are cases of
market failure. In these cases, neither the actions of the patent owner nor
her competitors are likely to overcome user resistance. This inquiry is a
first step that seeks to indicate how systematic thought about government
action to encourage user adoption can be useful. The goal of this
preliminary inquiry is twofold: to identify situations that warrant
government action and, through this investigation, to shed light on
situations in which government action may not be necessary. If we do not
embark on a systematic exploration of situations that are suitable for
government action, we will be unable to identify situations in which the
government action may be inappropriate. This section identifies two
situations where government action is justified because of market failure.
The two situations underscored are not an exhaustive list. These are cases
where technologies are characterized by network effects that require
critical mass for widespread adoption, and cases in which dissemination is
urgent.
149. See id. at 711.
150. For example, the Mac is known for its ease of use and Apple emphasizes this factor in its
advertising. See, e.g., Compare Mac Models, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/mac/compare (last
visited June 11, 2014) (“No matter which Mac you choose, you’re getting a computer that features
the latest technology and is ready to help you do amazing things right out of the box.”).
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A. Network Effects: Attaining Critical Mass
Government action is particularly important where a technology that is
characterized by network effects requires support to acquire critical mass.
Technologies characterized by network effects become desirable as more
people use them. Once a technology reaches critical mass, its rate of
adoption accelerates. For example, interactive technologies are often
characterized by network effects—the more people who use them, the
more functional they become. Consequently, it is often vital for interactive
technologies to attain critical mass in order to achieve widespread
dissemination.151 While some technologies characterized by network
effects may be successfully adopted without government action, in other
cases, government action could prevent a market failure.152
The adoption of the Minitel—a videotext system that gave the French
population many of the advantages of the Internet a decade earlier than the
rest of the world—illustrates the significance of government action to
attain critical mass and the ways in which a technology can attain a critical
mass. While consumers gladly endorsed the convenience of online plane
and train ticket purchase, grocery shopping, and abundant sources of
information and opportunities for social interaction, few realized that many
of these conveniences were available to large segments of the French
population since the 1980s. Minitel153 offered French phone customers a
multitude of online services including online banking; travel and ticketing
reservations; specialized information services (finance, health, travel and
151. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 343–44; Economides & Himmelberg, supra note 74, at 4–
6; Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 694–95 (1996);
Markus, supra note 77, at 194–95.
152. Government action to create critical mass may also be warranted in some cases where the
encouragement of standard-setting would promote interoperability. There are three options for
standardization: industry players can coordinate to select a single standard; the market may tip to
favor a certain standard; or the government may mandate a standard. Mark A. Lemley,
Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 745, 747 (1999). In certain cases, where the market or industry players are unlikely to achieve
standard-setting, the situation may warrant government action to prevent market failure. For
discussions of government action compared to other methods of standardization, see generally
Daniel Benoliel, Cyberspace Technological Standardization: An Institutional Theory Retrospective,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1259 (2003); Joseph Forrell & Garth Solaner, Competition, Compatibility
and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Dep’t
of Econ., Working Paper No. 8610, 1986); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet
Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (1996); Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards
Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2009). But see Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 112–13 (1994)
(cautioning against government action in cases of network effects).
153. The system was officially known as the French national videotex system. William L. CatsBaril & Tawfik Jelassi, The French Videotex System Minitel: A Successful Implementation of a
National Information Technology Infrastructure, 18 MIS Q. 1, 1 (1994).
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entertainment); online ordering of goods such as groceries; messaging
services (the anonymous sex forums were particularly successful); jobs and
classified ads; and interactive games.154
Minitel comprised a small monitor and a keyboard. It used the phone
connection to transmit text to and from the user.155 Minitel reached
mainstream adoption in France by the mid-1980s, soon after its
introduction in 1982. Many households and businesses used Minitel on an
everyday basis.156 Interestingly, in 1982, companies launched similar
services that used the same technology in many other countries, including
the United States, sixteen Western European countries, and Japan. Yet
these systems failed to achieve the widespread dissemination enjoyed by
the French Minitel. Consequently, residents of these countries waited until
the mid-1990s to benefit from the advantages of an online system—the
Internet.157
Commentators raise different theories to explain the success of the
French Minitel in comparison to the failure of similar online services in
other countries. Particularly, they point to the rapid creation of a critical
mass of Minitel users. Minitel is an interactive communication system. It
requires a significant number of users to draw in service providers, who in
turn bring in additional users. Thus, analysts explain that the French
government’s monopoly on Minitel services and the initial free distribution
of the system to all phone consumers rapidly brought in the necessary
critical mass of users.158 Conversely, promoters of similar systems in other
154. See Eric Brousseau, E-Commerce in France: Did Early Adoption Prevent Its
Development?, 19 INFO. SOC’Y 45, 46 (2003); Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 12. An email
service was added in 1991. Id. at 8.
155. See H.L. Moulaison, The Minitel and France’s Legacy of Democratic Information
Access, 21 GOV. INFO. Q. 99, 101 (2004).
156. In 1985, 39% of French businesses used Minitel. By 1990, 84% of French businesses
used Minitel and a third of the population had access to it, whether at home or at work. Finally, by
1992, about half the French population had access to Minitel. Brousseau, supra note 154, at 46;
Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 16.
157. See Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 9; Ya-Ching Lee, Newspaper Online
Services: A Successful Business? Lessons Learned from Videotext Failure 5– 6, 11–13 (July 1999)
(Ph. D dissertation, Indiana University), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down
load?doi=10.1.1.42.9681&rep=rep1&type=pdf (discussing the failure of newspaper videotext
systems in the United States); Miles & Thomas, supra note 50, at 255 (discussing the failure of the
British videotext system).
158. Brousseau, supra note 154, at 46. Specifically, the government initially distributed
Minitel for free as the only effective source of directory assistance. Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note
153, at 4–5, 10, 15; Moulaison, supra note 155, at 101. Commentators identified additional factors
that contributed to Minitel’s success. These factors included the easy-to-use design and the use of
the French telephone system solely as a transmission gateway and not as an information provider.
See Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 9, 10–11, 15; Miles & Thomas, supra note 50, at 262–
66.
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countries failed to meet the critical mass challenge.159 With the benefit of
hindsight, based on the success of the Internet and Minitel, parallel online
systems had the potential for mass adoption outside France during the early
1980s. Yet, most of the world’s residents received the benefits of an online
system over a decade later, when the Internet reached popular use.160
B. Urgency
Market processes take time as different groups of users with different
levels of risk aversion and technological sophistication decide whether to
adopt a new technology.161 Some technological adoption processes take a
year or less, while others may take decades or even centuries. Yet in times
of national emergencies, particularly those involving health threats,
governments may need to intervene to expedite the market process.
Intervention in these cases is necessary because of the dire implications of
a market failure to achieve widespread dissemination of the technology in a
timely manner.162 The U.S. government’s intervention in the dissemination
159. See, e.g., Ya-Ching Lee, supra note 157, at 5–6, 11–13 (discussing the failure of
newspaper videotext systems in the United States); Miles & Thomas, supra note 50 (discussing the
failure of the British videotext system).
160. Some believe that Minitel was not necessarily a success story because it delayed the
adoption of the Internet in France. See, e.g., Hugh Dauncey, A Cultural Battle: French Minitel, the
Internet and the Superhighway, 3 CONVERGENCE 72, 77–78 (1997) (pointing out that the French
attachment to Minitel is one of the factors that delayed Internet adoption in the country); Amy
Harmon, Why the French Hate the Internet, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1997-01-27/news/mn-22569_1_french-culture (reporting that the
French devotion to Minitel is part of the reason for their antagonism to the Internet). And,
doubtless, Minitel did play a role in France’s delayed Internet adoption. Yet the picture is more
complex. First, e-commerce fared differently than individual user adoption. Although in 1997 only
22% of French businesses were online (compared to 58% in the United States), businesses could
take advantage of the infrastructure and experience they gained in Minitel, and they closed the gap
quickly. By 2001, 80% of all French businesses were online (compared to 88% in the United
States). Brousseau, supra note 154, at 51. Second, adoption by individual users did lag behind.
Between 1997–2007, the French individual user adoption lagged 25% behind the United States; the
gap only began shrinking in 2007, and then closed in 2010. Internet Users (per 100 People), U.N.
DATA (2012), http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=internet+users&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aIT.
NET.USER.P2. Although Minitel played a role in the user adoption delay, additional factors
contributed, including a low rate of homeownership of personal computers and an underdeveloped
cable network. See generally Brousseau, supra note 154. Third, even acknowledging that Minitel
did contribute to the delayed individual user adoption between 1997–2007, critics should balance
the costs of this delay against the fact that from 1982–1995 the French exclusively possessed many
of the advantages of the Internet. Furthermore, despite the slow rate of adoption from 1997, many
French residents did enjoy both the Internet and Minitel throughout this period.
161. For a description of adopter types, including innovators, early adopters, early majority,
late majority, and laggards, see ROGERS, supra note 54, at 282–85.
162. Sometimes market failure occurs when the window of opportunity is broader (beyond a
few weeks or months or even a year) but time is still of the essence, as when the market delays
adoption of environmental technologies designed to reduce pollution. Yet, the discussion of
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of the swine flu vaccine illustrates the importance of expediting market
processes in these situations.
The swine flu epidemic broke out in the spring of 2009.163 In June of
that year, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the swine flu to
be the first pandemic in forty-two years.164 Deaths from the swine flu
during the spring raised fears of a massive epidemic that would kill many
once the flu season began in the fall of 2009.165 A flu vaccine was ready by
the early fall of 2009.166 Yet, the government’s challenge was to vaccinate
the population at large, beginning with the groups that were particularly at
risk.167 Public health experts warned that health care providers should
vaccinate the whole, or at least most, of the U.S. population within a
couple of weeks to prevent massive outbreaks of the swine flu that could
culminate in a large death toll.168 Under these circumstances, the
government could not wait for market forces to take their course. The
government faced a double task—to ensure not only an adequate supply of
vaccine, but also to create demand for the vaccine by the population at
large.
The U.S. government acted quickly. First, it eliminated the price
obstacle by providing the vaccine for free.169 However, it had to do much
more to overcome resistance. The government vaccinated school children
in public schools and opened centers in many communities during the
weekends to facilitate the process of vaccination.170 In addition, the
whether these situations should also be included within the category of urgency is beyond the scope
of this Article.
163. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Declares Public Health Emergency Over Swine Flu,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/27flu.
html?_r=0.
164. Niko Kyrakou, Swine Flu Didn’t Fly, DEEP J. (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.deepjournal.com/p/43/a/en/2527.html.
165. JoNel Aleccia, Swine Flu Fears Subside, but Second Wave Looms, NBC NEWS (May 4,
2009, 9:41 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30563707.
166. See Donald G. McNeil, Swine Flu Vaccinations Start as Officials Attack Myths, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/us/07flu.html.
167. See Elizabeth Weise, Swine Flu Vaccine Arrives, and the Scramble Begins, USA TODAY,
Oct. 2, 2009, at 1A, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-10-01-swineflu-vaccine_N.htm#.
168. See 2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/acip.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2009); WHO
Recommendations on Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 13, 2009),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_vaccine_20090713/en/index.html.
169. See Julie Bosman, Long Lines to Get Free Swine Flu Shot in New York City, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/nyregion/15clinic.html.
170. See Erin Allday, Thousands Swamp S.F. Clinics to Get Vaccines, S.F. CHRON. ( Oct. 30,
2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Thousands-swamp-S-F-clinics-to-getvaccine-3282492.php; Michael Laris, D.C. Swine Flu Plan Includes Vaccination Hubs, Network of

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 7

1314

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

government engaged in a massive advertisement campaign. It not only had
to advertise the availability of the vaccine for free, but also had to
overcome fears of the consequences of taking the vaccine.171 Many
individuals were afraid to take the vaccine due to concerns about
dangerous side effects. Specifically, they feared that the vaccine was new
and different from previous flu vaccines, and therefore, entailed additional
risks.172
The feared swine flu epidemic did not break out during the flu season of
2009–2010.173 Some critics argued that the swine flu vaccines were
unnecessary and that the swine flu was never destined to become an
epidemic. No consensus has yet been reached on this point.174 Yet, the
criticism was targeted at the decision-making process and the conclusions
of the medical agencies (the WHO and the Center for Disease Control
(CDC)), not the government’s adoption of these conclusions and its
implementation process.175 Given the recommendations of the medical
Health-Care Providers, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-0905/news/36857385_1_swine-flu-vaccinations-clinic-doctors.
171. HHS Secretary Sebelius Unveils New H1N1 Advertisement That Will Air During New
Year’s College Football Bowl Games, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Dec. 31, 2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/12/20091231a.html; Rich Thomaselli, Government PSA
Urges Americans to Get Swine-Flu Vaccine, ADAGE.COM (Dec. 7, 2009),
http://adage.com/article/news/advertising-psa-urges-americans-swine-flu-vaccine/140923/.
172. See Michael Specter, The Fear Factor, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/10/12/091012taco_talk_specter; Poll: One-Third of
U.S. Parents Oppose H1N1 Vaccines, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2009, 4:34 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-10-07-swine-flu-poll_N.htm.
173. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, UPDATED CDC ESTIMATES OF 2009
H1N1 INFLUENZA CASES, HOSPITALIZATIONS AND DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 2009 –APRIL
10, 2010 (May 14, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates_2009_h1n1.htm.
174. See, e.g., Philip Bethge et al., The Great Swine Flu Boosterism of 2009, S.F. SENTINEL
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=65052 (quoting Wolfgang Wodarg, a
member of the German parliament, telling the European Council that “millions of people worldwide
were vaccinated for no good reason”); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Reaction to Swine Flu: Apt and
Lucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/health/
02flu.html?_r=0 (quoting leading medical professionals praising the government’s response);
Editorial, H1N1dsight is a Wonderful Thing, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 182, 182 (2010) (“Although the
nature of the threat may have been overstated, the WHO, CDC and other authorities had little
scientific evidence at the beginning of the H1N1 pandemic to discount the most dire predictions of
fatalities.”); Billions Wasted Over Swine Flu, Says Paul Flynn MP, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10396382 (quoting disparate views regarding whether mass vaccination
was a mistake).
175. Kyrakou, supra note 164 (reporting on criticisms of the WHO’s definition of pandemic
and the allegations that the WHO created panic to boost vaccine sales); WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
DRAFT REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
REGULATIONS (2005) AND ON PANDEMIC INFLUENZA A (H1N1) 2009, at 14–15, 18–19 (2011),
http://www.who.int/ihr/preview_report_review_committee_mar2011_en.pdf (criticizing the WHO’s
definition of pandemic but finding no evidence of motivation to create panic to enrich vaccine
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authorities at the time, vaccination of the population was imperative.176
And it is clear that at that time, absent these steps, health care workers
would have vaccinated a far smaller segment of the U.S. population.
CONCLUSION
While traditional critique of the patent system’s failure to encourage
dissemination focuses on the increasing strength of patent rights, this
Article showed that dissemination often fails because patent law largely
ignores the ordinary user. The ordinary user is a critical player who
determines the fate of new technologies through his mundane everyday
decisions of whether to adopt a new technology. Yet, patent law treats
competition as a proxy for dissemination and focuses on the patent owner
and his competitors, but addresses the ordinary user only indirectly as it
views him as motivated by availability and price alone.
This Article explored the reasons for user resistance and showed that
these can be categorized into two main sources of resistance: resistance to
the novelty of the technology and resistance to the perceived consequences
of using the technology. It argued that the technology-regulating regime
should incorporate gentle nudges that address the complexities of the
ordinary user. This Article revealed that although patent law contains some
gentle nudges to indirectly encourage user adoption, the law addresses only
a limited part of the reasons for user resistance. And while different
government agencies currently attempt to encourage user adoption, they do
so in a piecemeal and inconsistent manner.
This Article underscored the need to incorporate a systematic
framework of gentle nudges to address the full spectrum of reasons for user
resistance. Specifically, this Article argued that government action, through
gentle nudges to encourage user adoption, is particularly warranted in two
instances of market failure: where a technology is characterized by network
effects and needs to acquire critical mass, and where dissemination is
urgent and time is of the essence.

manufacturers); Mike Adams, Flu Vaccines, Pharma Fraud, Quack Science, the CDC and WHO –
All Exposed by Richard Gale and Gary Null, NATURAL NEWS (July 2, 2010),
http://www.naturalnews.com/029124_flu_vaccines_quackery.html (stating that the CDC’s support
for vaccination “raises an alarm about our federal government’s scientific integrity, and calls into
question its true allegiance and purpose: to protect the health of American citizens or increase Big
Pharma profits”).
176. H1N1dsight is a Wonderful Thing, supra note 174, at 182 (“Faced with the certainty of a
new influenza virus to which a large proportion of the world’s population was immunologically
naïve, and the uncertainty of the predictive epidemiological models, governments had little political
choice but to act, anticipating something close to the worst case scenario.”).
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